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Abstract 
Multidisciplinary innovation is the engine of growth of an increasing number of 
economies. Innovation output depends increasingly on information sharing and 
cooperation between creative agents. Sharing and cooperation requires the existence 
of generalised trust. Social capital consists of trust and trust-based networks. Our 
main goal is to illustrate theoretically the importance of social capital to the growth of 
an innovation economy. 
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1. Introduction 
With this paper, we propose an endogenous growth model with which to frame 
and analytically convey the idea that social capital influences innovation and, through 
it, economic growth. Akçomak and Weel (2009) argue empirically that, by 
facilitating interaction, cooperation and sharing, social capital influences innovation 
activities, thereby impacting on economic growth. We provide a theoretical portray of 
this suggested chain of causality between social capital, innovation and economic 
growth. 
Innovation has been the engine of growth in countries such as Austria, Finland, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, between 1995 and 2006 (OECD, 
2010), and, in their search for sustainable sources of economic growth, more 
industrialised and emerging nations are expected to become innovation economies. 
The Europe 2020 Strategy provides an example of this.  
No longer confined in concept to the result of technological and scientific R&D 
activities, undertaken exclusively by academically formed researchers, innovation 
consists of the introduction of a new product or service, a new process, or a new 
method (Oslo Manual, 2005). Its multidisciplinary nature, growing complexity and 
costs require a productive structure that enables cooperation and information sharing 
between innovators. The success of such productive environment requires the 
existence of social capital in the innovation economy. We offer a theoretical 
illustration for this argument. 
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Routledge and Amsberg (2002) identify Hanifan (1916) as the first to use the 
term social capital in business and economics contexts. As reviewed by Beugelsdijk 
and Schaik (2005), a consensual definition of social capital has proved difficult to 
obtain, with Putnam et al. (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) together giving social capital 
its most generalised definition. 
Putnam et al. (1993) define social capital as the set of norms and networks that 
facilitate cooperation and coordinated actions. Trust spreads transitively through 
networks. Tust increases cooperation, which increases turst, in a virtuous circle. The 
World Bank defines social capital as the set of norms and networks that enable 
collective action.  
For Fukuyama (1995), social capital is generalised trust rooted on ethical and 
reciprocal moral habits and obligations common to all members of a society. Trust is 
one’s expectation of another’s reliability regarding obligations, cooperative behaviour 
and fairness in actions and negotiations (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). In this sense, 
repeated trustful interactions between strangers within a country lead to higher levels 
of generalised trust (Crudelia, 2006).  
Following Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005), we sum up and adopt the definition 
of social capital as the set of network-based processes, built upon generalised trust, 
that influence the ability of a country’s inhabitants to share, cooperate and coordinate 
actions. In short, social capital is generalised trust and its networks. 
Uzzi (1996) and Gulati (1998), for instance, find that through trust- networks, 
diverse and important information flows freely. Information is crucial for 
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multidisciplinary innovation activity, hence our wish to frame analytically the 
mechanisms through which social capital influences innovation and consequently 
influences economic growth. 
The effects of social capital on economic growth can be theoretically modelled 
both at the individual and at the aggregate level. Regarding microeconomic channels, 
trust and cooperation within the firm, industry or market may lower transactions 
costs, help enforce contracts and improve credit access. In a macroeconomic 
perspective, according to Easterly and Levine (1997) for instance, social capital can 
increase the effectiveness of economic policies. Related empirical literature searches 
for evidence of a positive relation between social capital and economic growth, 
without distinguishing microeconomic from macroeconomic channels. In fact, most 
of the studies connecting social capital and economic growth use a definition of 
social capital at the aggregate level, using, as a proxy for social capital, a measure of 
trust provided by the World Bank. Fukuyama (1995), for example, finds cross-
national differences in economic growth correlated with differences in national levels 
of trust. Knack and Keefer (1997) and Temple and Johnson (1998) also obtain a 
positive relationship between trust and economic growth. Dinda (2008) identifies 
more studies documenting a positive relation between trust and growth, such as 
Heller (1996), Ostrom (2000), Rose (2000), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), 
Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2004), Bjornskov (2006), Glaeser et al. (2000), Alesina 
and Ferrara (2002), Miguel (2003), Sobel (2002), Tau (2003), Rupasingha (2000), 
Zak and Knack (2001). 
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As Rupasingha et al. (2006) observe, few attempts have been made to explain 
analytically how social capital accumulates - the few theoretical contributions 
concerning mostly microeconomic level effects. This adds to our motivation for 
developing a model that explains analytically how social capital grows, how it 
influences innovation activity and consequently how it is linked to economic growth. 
With Akçomak and Weel (2009) as our main reference, we portray an 
innovation economy with a non-scale, two-sector, idea-based growth model with 
complementarities between intermediate goods and services in the aggregate 
production function. The assumption of complementarities strikes us as ideal for 
capturing an innovation economy’s nature, in that rent-seeking firms benefit from 
cooperating and sharing. Building on Thompson (1998), we reinterpret R&D 
activities as innovation activities, and develop a two-sector productive structure, i.e. 
with different production functions for output and new innovations. In the introduced 
production function for new innovations, we assume that social capital increases 
innovators’ productivity. We also specify that the innovation growth rate decreases 
with the level of innovation. A fixed innovation’s depreciation rate is considered. 
Additionally, we introduce social capital and its accumulation function into the 
model. Knack (2002) distinguishes between government social capital and civil social 
capital. Government social capital represents government principles and institutions. 
Civil social capital consists in common values, norms and trust-based networks. In 
this paper, we choose not to attribute any responsibility for the accumulation of social 
capital to the government. Hence, this model contemplates only civil social capital. 
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When thinking of our stylised innovation economy’s stock of social capital, unlike 
Akçomak and Weel (2009), we do not give much deterministic relevance to History, 
as our wish is to emphasise the possible existence of an automatic, continuous 
mechanism linking monopolistic competitor’s profits to social capital accumulation. 
We assume then that social capital accumulation does not depend on government’s 
decisions nor on firms’ decisions. It depends positively and automatically on: (i) 
monopolistic competitors’ profits; and (ii) the economy’s existing stock of social 
capital. 
Our main finding is that the equilibrium long run growth rate depends 
positively on the output-workers to innovators ratio. Despite being an innovation 
economy, whose engine of growth lies in the innovation sector, the proportion of 
output-workers to innovators must rise if there is to be higher economic growth. As 
Jones (1995, 2002) points out, this prediction meets the empirical evidence that long 
run growth does not grow proportionally with the number of researchers,. 
The paper is structured in 4 Sections. After this Introduction, in Section 2, we 
set up the model. Section 3 contains the general equilibrium solution and a discussion 
of our main findings. The paper is closed with some Final Remarks. 
 
2. The Model 
We frame the long run growth of an innovation economy with a non-scale, two-
sector, idea-based, growth model with complementarities between intermediate goods 
& services in the aggregate production function. Introducing social capital to our 
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stylised innovation economy, we assume that social capital enhances innovators’ 
productivity. Social capital accumulation depends automatically and positively on 
intermediate firms’ profits, as well as on its own level. 
Our goal is to illustrate analytically the mechanisms through which social 
capital influences innovation, consequently impacting on long run economic growth. 
 
2.1. Production Side – The Technology Equation 
2.1.1. Aggregate Output – Final Good 
The economy’s aggregate output is the final good )(tY  produced, using as 
inputs, output-workers )(tLY  and the intermediate goods & services )(txi  of a 
number )(tA  of intermediate firms i  )0....=( Ai . Each differentiated intermediate 
good or service is associated with one innovation i. In this horizontal-differentiation 
model, once in existence, each intermediate firm remains in the market forever, with 
exclusivity in the production and commercialisation of its good or service. 
2.1.2. Complementarities between Intermediate Goods & Services  
Intermediate firms Ai 0....= contribute to final output )(tY  with differentiated 
goods & services, each one of these associated with one innovation Ai 0....= . The 
presence of complementarities between intermediate inputs in the aggregate 
production function means that the increase in one intermediate firm’s production 
increases the marginal productivity, hence returns, of the other intermediate firms. 
This assumption of complementarities is made to frame the idea that cooperation and 
sharing of information and knowledge are beneficial for profit-seeking firms and 
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essential to the growth of an innovation economy.  
Accordingly, the aggregate production function is: 
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Constant returns to scale in the production function require the parameter 
restriction that  = . Additionally, assumption 1>  is made so that intermediate 
goods & services ix  are complementary to one another; i.e., so that the increase in the 
quantity of one input increases the marginal productivity of the other inputs. In order 
to obtain a balanced growth path (BGP) solution, a parameter restriction is imposed: 
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1
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Assuming that it takes one unit of physical capital )(tK  to produce one 
physical unit of any input, the stock of physical capital is related to intermediate 
goods & services by the rule: 
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Final-good producers are price takers in the market for intermediate goods & 
services. In equilibrium, they equate the price of each input )(tR j to its marginal 
productivity. The price of )(tY is normalised to one. The inverse demand function 
faced by each intermediate firm is, then: 
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In expression (4), we can see the complementarities effect, i.e. the increase in 
one input’s quantities increases the demand for all the other intermediate goods & 
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services. 
2.1.3. Intermediate Firms 
Each intermediate firm makes two decisions: (i) whether or not to enter the 
market as a monopolistic competitor; and (ii) once in the market, to maximise its 
profits in each period of time. Regarding the first decision, in each period of time t , 
in order to enter the market, an intermediate firm must buy an innovation’s patent. 
Like in Evans et al. (1998), followed by Thompson (2008), each patent’s price 
consists of an up-front cost of )()( titPA , where )(tPA  is the standard cost of every 
new innovations, and )(ti  represents an additional cost specific to innovation i , 
meaning that the higher the index i of a new innovation, the higher its innovation 
cost. Entering the market, intermediate firm i will become a monopolistic producer of 
a differentiated intermediate good or service. The intermediate firm’s decision to 
enter the market requires comparison between the innovation patent price paid up-
front at time t, for the Ath innovation, and the discounted value of the stream of profits 
𝜋𝑖(𝑡) obtained from t onwards. Intermediate firm’s dynamic zero-profit condition is, 
hence: 
 ,)(=)()(
)( 

 detAtP i
tr
t
A


  
whose, time-differentiation (assuming no bubbles) gives: 
( )()( tAtPA )
̇
= 𝑟 )()( tAtPA − 𝜋𝑖,  
equivalent to: 
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Having decided to enter the market, an intermediate firm’s second decision 
is to maximise its profits in each period of time. The physical production of one unit 
of each input requires one unit of physical capital. Hence, in each period, the 
monopolistic intermediate firm maximises profits, taking as given the inverse demand 
function (4) for its good: 
 ),()()(=)(max
)(
trxtxtRt iiii
t
i
x
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which leads to mark-up rule: 
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
r
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The model’s symmetry implies that )(=)( tRtRi , )(=)( txtxi  and )(=)( tti  . 
Then )(tR  is rewritten as: 
 ,= 11
1   xALR Y  (7) 
while )(tx  becomes: 
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1
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Profits )()()(1=)( txtRt    are given by: 
   .1= 11  xALY
  (9) 
The model’s symmetry implies also that equation (3) simplifies to AxK = , and 
production function (1) becomes: 
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2.1.3 Physical Capital Accumulation 
In this closed economy without government, investment in physical capital is, 
in each period of time, financed by family savings, which correspond to what is left 
of aggregate output after consumption. Assuming zero capital depreciation, for 
simplicity, physical capital accumulation is given by: 
 ).()(=)( tCtYtK 

 (11) 
2.1.4. Innovation Sector 
Multidisciplinary innovation is undertaken by innovators )(tLA  whose 
productivity depends on the economy’s stock of social capital )(tS . Such assumption 
is made under the belief that innovation processes involve cooperation and sharing of 
information, which requires the existence of trust between innovators. Their source of 
knowledge is the stock of already invented innovations, whose patent manuals are in 
a free-access library. We assume that the higher the stock of existing inventions, the 
more difficult it is to create additional innovations, more specifically we assume that 
the growth rate of innovations depends negatively on
)(tA . We also assume, for 
further realism, a fixed depreciation rate, d, for the innovations stock. The production 
function for new innovations that we propose is: 
 ),()()()(=)( 1 tdAtLtStAtA A 


  (12) 
where parameter  represents efficiency in the innovation’s sector. 
 
2.1.5. Social Capital Accumulation 
 
We do not wish to specify social capital formation as a direct result of 
optimization decisions of either the government or any other economic agents. Nor 
do we intend to assume it to grow exogenously, without explanation. Hence we 
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assume that social capital accumulation depends positively and automatically on 
intermediate firms’ profits. It also depends positively on its own stock, in a self-
reinforcing way. The equation for social capital accumulation here proposed is: 
 )()(=)( ttStS  

, (13) 
where parameter  stands for the economy’s propensity towards trust building. 
 
2.1.6. Labour Market 
Total population L , assumed constant, choose whether to work in real output 
production or in innovation: 
 
 
AY LLL  , (14) 
Equation (14) implies that: 
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A
LY g
L
L
g  ,  
Final-good producers’ profit maximisation condition, 
𝑑𝜋𝑌
𝑑𝐿𝑌
= 0, gives output-
workers wage: 
 .)1(=
 xAL
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dY
w Y
Y
Y

  (15) 
Innovators’ profit maximisation condition, 
𝑑𝜋𝐴
𝑑𝐿𝐴
= 0, gives innovators’ 
remuneration: 
 .=
1 ASPSAAP
dL
Ad
APw AA
A
AA 
  

 (16) 
Equilibrium in the labour market is achieved with the indifference condition 
that labour remuneration is equal across sectors: 
 .
)1( 1
S
xAL
Pww YAAY

 
 
  (17) 
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2.1.7. Technology Equation 
The Technology Equation unites the pairs of constant growth rates and interest 
rates ),( rg  for which the production side of the economy is in its balanced growth 
path (BGP) equilibrium. As will become evident later on, in a BGP equilibrium, the 
interest rate is constant and hence so is

r
R  . Then, log-time-differentiation of 
expression (8) says that: 
 ,= ALYx ggg   (18) 
from which follows that physical capital grows at the rate: .)(1= AK gg   
Log-time-differentiation of production function (10) gives us the growth rate of 
output:  
  AAY ggg )(1==   . 
Innovation’s growth rate is derived from equation (12):  
 ,= d
A
SL
A
A
g AA 



 (19) 
which says that in a BGP solution it must be that: 𝑔𝑆 = 𝑔𝐴 − 𝑔𝐿𝐴. 
Social capital’s growth rate is given by equation (13):  
,=
SS
S
g S

 

 
which means that, in the BGP solution, intermediate firms’ profits and social capital, 
grow at the same rate: 
 𝑔𝜋 = 𝑔𝑆 = 𝑔𝐴 − 𝑔𝐿𝐴  (20) 
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Log-time-differentiation of expression (17) gives us the growth rate of 
innovation’s standard price: 
  ,1= SxALYP ggggg A    
which, recalling equation (18), is equivalent to: 
  ,1= LAAP ggg A    
equivalent, recalling restriction (2), to: 
 𝑔𝑃𝐴 = 𝑔𝐿𝐴  (21) 
We proceed by developing the dynamic zero-profit condition (5): 
 .



AP
rgg
A
APA   (22) 
Equations (21) and (22) together imply that a BGP solution entails the 
following equality: 
 𝑔𝜋 = 𝑔𝑃𝐴 + 𝜉𝑔𝐴 = 𝑔𝐿𝐴 + 𝜉𝑔𝐴.  (23) 
Equations (22) and (19) together mean that: 
 𝑔𝐿𝐴 = 0𝑔𝐿𝑌 = 0.  (24) 
It then follows that: 
 𝑔𝑃𝐴 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑆 = 𝑔𝜋 = 𝑔𝑥 = 𝜉𝑔𝐴.   
Recalling that AY gg )(1=  , equation (22) becomes then our Technology Equation: 
 
 













AP
rg
A
Y
1
,  
which, using equations (9), (17) and (19), is equivalent to: 
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Where constant Ω =
(1−𝛾)𝛼
(1−𝛼)
. 
2.2. Consumption Side - The Euler Equation 
Globally connected, well informed and participative, citizens contribute to 
innovation economies with labour, ideas and concrete demands regarding 
consumption. They desire innovative goods and services, which are aggregated in the 
form of final good Y . We can then capture consumers’ decisions with the standard 
intertemporal consumption specification. Consumers being immortal and 
homogeneous, their representative wishes to maximise, subject to a budget constraint, 
the discounted value of utility:  
 dt
tC
e t
tC 






 1
)(
max
1
0)(
 (26) 
 ),()()(=)(.. tCLtwtrEtEts   (27) 
where )(tC  is consumption of )(tY  in period t ;  >0 is the rate of time preference; 
and 1  >0 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption at two periods in 
time. Total assets are )(tE ; r  is the interest rate; )(tw  is the wage rate, and it is 
assumed that each citizen provides one unit of labour per unit of time. The 
transversality condition is 0,=)()(lim tEt
t


 )(t  being the shadow price of assets, 
and consumers’ decisions are described by the Euler Equation:  
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 (28) 
according to which the interest rate, r, is constant in a BGP equilibrium. 
 
3. General Equilibrium 
We have already asserted that  𝑔𝑆 = 𝑔𝜋 = 𝑔𝑥 = 𝜉𝑔𝐴, and that capital )(tK  
grows at the same rate as output )(tY : .)(1= AYK ggg  The economy’s budget 
constraint (11) in turn says that, because YK gg  , a constant Kg  requires that )(tC  
grows at the same rate as )(tK and )(tY . That is: 
.0= KCK gg
K
C
K
Y
g
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K
K
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With labour constant, the per-capita economic growth rate is equal to:  
 .)(1==== AKYC ggggg   
3.1. The Steady-State Equilibrium 
The BGP general equilibrium solution is obtained by solving the system of two 
equations, (25) and (28), in two unknowns, r  and g : 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑔 =
1
𝜎
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, Ω =
(1−𝛾)𝛼
(1−𝛼)
  
 (29) 
Restriction 0>> gr  is imposed so that: (i) present values are finite; and (ii) our 
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solution(s) have positive interest and growth rates. 
Proposition Existence of a unique steady-state solution for 

















A
Y
L
L
1
>  and 
d
L
L
A
Y >. 
Proof. As Figure 1 represents, in the space ),( gr , the linear Euler equation (28) has 
gradient 
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑔
=  > 0, the value it assumes on the vertical axis is 𝑟 =  and the value it 
takes on the horizontal axis is 𝑔 = −
𝜌
𝜎
. To ensure that gr > , we impose 1>  so that the 
Euler equation lies above the 45º line (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). The Technology 
equation is also positively sloped. Hence, if: (i) the value it takes on the vertical axis, 
𝑟 = 𝑑Ω
𝐿𝑌
𝐿𝐴
, is greater than ; and (ii) its slope, 
𝑑𝑟
𝑑𝑔
=
𝜉+Ω
𝐿𝑌
𝐿𝐴
𝜉+1
, is smaller than , then the 
Euler and the Technology equations cross only once in the first quadrant of the (r, g) 
space, and the BGP equilibrium is unique. 
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Figure 1. Analytical BGP general equilibrium unique solution 
 
The general equilibrium growth rate is given by: 
 
1
=*








A
Y
A
Y
L
L
L
L
d
g  (30) 
At this point, it seems relevant to make an observation regarding the scale-
effects prediction, present in many growth models, according to which long run 
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growth depends on the size of the country, given by its population, ?̅?. This prediction 
stems analytically from having constant ?̅? in the aggregate production function. As 
this is not empirically validated, many growth models, reviewed by Jones (1999), 
include in the model another function of  ?̅?, so that the scale-effects prediction is 
annulled. 
The proposed model, despite considering constant population in the aggregate 
production function, and without doing any deliberate analytical moves in order to 
remove it from the general equilibrium solution, does not exhibit the scale-effects 
prediction, as we can see in solution (30). It is a self-made-nonscale growth model. 
 
3.2. Effects on Economic Growth 
Our main finding is that the equilibrium growth rate depends positively on the 
output-workers to innovators ratio, i.e. 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕(
𝐿𝑌
𝐿𝐴
)
> 0. In this stylised innovation 
economy, whose engine of growth is innovation, the proportion of output-workers to 
innovators must increase if there is to be higher economic growth. This result is in 
agreement with empirical findings that long run growth does not grow proportionally 
with the number of researchers, as Jones (1995, 2002) notes. 
The here introduced model also predicts that the equilibrium growth rate is 
positively influenced by the innovations’ depreciation rate, i.e. 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑑
> 0. We can 
reason this effect with the thought that a higher innovation’s depreciation rate 
increases the innovation activities and output, leading to higher economic growth. 
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Another result worth mentioning, we believe, concerns the fact that both the 
innovation efficiency parameter and the parameter representing the economy’s 
propensity for accumulating social capital are determined endogenously. As can be 
derived from equations (12) and (13), these two parameters depend on the 
equilibrium growth rate, as well as on the economy’s levels of knowledge and social 
capital. Such result accentuates the self-contained, self-solved character of the here 
introduced growth model. 
 
4. Final Remarks 
A growing number of industrialised and emerging economies are assuming the 
character of innovation economies, their main engine of economic growth being 
multidisciplinary innovation. 
Multidisciplinary innovation consists of the introduction of a new product or 
service, a new process, or a new method. It is increasingly competitive, complex and 
costly, compelling innovators to cooperate and share information. The higher the 
innovator’s ability to share and cooperate, the higher the innovation’s output, hence 
the higher the economic growth rate. The ability to share and cooperate can be 
enhanced by the existence of trust and trust-based networks, that is, by the economy’s 
stock of social capital. 
The main purpose of this paper has been to highlight the importance of social 
capital in the growth process of an innovation economy. We have developed a growth 
model that provides an analytical illustration of the mechanisms linking social capital 
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to innovation activity, and innovation activity to economic growth. 
We have portrayed a stylised innovation economy and its long run growth 
through a non-scale, two-sector, idea-based growth model, with complementarities 
between intermediate inputs in the aggregate production function, in which we have 
introduced social capital. 
Our main finding is that the equilibrium growth rate depends positively on the 
output-workers to innovators ratio. That is, higher economic growth requires an 
increase in the output-workers to innovators ratio. As observed by Jones (1995, 
2002), this result meets empirical findings that long run growth does not grow 
proportionally with the number of researchers. 
The proposed framework is fairly complete, encompassing production of 
aggregate output; production of differentiated intermediate goods and services; two 
types of workers in different productive sectors; accumulation of knowledge, of 
physical capital and of social capital. Knowledge, physical capital and social capital 
are all fundamental in this stylised innovation economy. Their growth reveals strict 
interdependence, in an endogenous fashion, and this enables the model to deliver an 
equilibrium growth rate that depends, very simply, on the proportion of output-
workers relative to innovators. 
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